



Hands-on MCP Servers Beyond 101: Good Practices, Design Choices and Consequences



DevDays Europe 2026, Vilnius


Horacio González

2026-05-19





Who are we?

Introducing myself and
introducing Clever Cloud



Horacio Gonzalez - @LostInBrittany

Spaniard Lost in Brittany



Head of DevRel



clever cloud

Clever Cloud

Sovereign European Cloud Provider




clever cloud



Before we start

How the day works...
and the software you'll need




What you need

- **Bun 1.1+:** runtime + package manager
- **An agentic assistant:** Claude Code preferred, Antigravity / Codex / Copilot also fine
- **Git** and a **terminal**
- A laptop you can `bun install` on

Don't have Bun yet?

```
curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
```

Run it **now**, we'll be on slides for 15 more minutes





[https://github.com/LostInBrittany/
devdays-2026-hands-on-mcp-beyond-101.git](https://github.com/LostInBrittany/devdays-2026-hands-on-mcp-beyond-101.git)



The rhythm for each module

1. **I present**
Slides land the concept, the design choice, the traps
2. **You code**
Pair up, break things, ask questions
3. **solutions/**
Drop-in reference if you fall behind or want to compare


Most of today is your terminal, not my slides.

**Raise your hand if you're stuck,
help your neighbour if you finish early**



The Agentic Revolution

From helpers to actors:
How AI learned to do, not just say




From Chatbots to Agents

Tell me what to visit in Madrid



Madrid is vibrant, elegant, and full of art, history, and food. Here are the most important things to visit in Madrid, perfect for a first trip 🇪🇸...




2023: ChatGPT - Smart conversation



From Chatbots to Agents

What's the weather like in Madrid today?

Today it is sunny in Madrid, but very cold, take a coat.



```
getWeather("Madrid (ES)")
```




```
{"weather": "sunny",  
 "temperature": "1.8°C"}
```



Madrid (ES)
1.8°C

3.8 km/h wind

2024: Tool use - LLMs can do things




From Chatbots to Agents


Plan a 3-day trip to Madrid for me



I've planned your Madrid trip:

- Flights booked (€247 round-trip)
 - Hotel near Retiro Park (3 nights)
 - Day 1: Prado Museum + tapas tour
 - Day 2: Royal Palace + Retiro Park
 - Day 3: Reina Sofía + shopping
- All added to your calendar with confirmations sent to your email.




- 
- 🙄 Agent planning:
1. Check weather forecast → calls weather API
 2. Find flights → searches travel APIs
 3. Book accommodation → queries booking sites
 4. Create itinerary → combines museum data, restaurant reviews
 5. Add to calendar → writes calendar entries
 6. Send confirmation → emails summary

2025: Autonomous agents - LLMs that plan and execute




From Chatbots to Agents

I'm thinking about taking the kids to Madrid this summer...




Email agent

Scans inbox, finds school holiday dates




Calendar agent

Blocks optimal week in July



Finance agent

Checks budget, sets aside travel funds



Packing agent

Creates family packing list

2026: Agents are everywhere




When Chatbots Hallucinate

- Read the output
- Laugh, correct it
- No real damage

Name a famous London landmark



The Marble Clock Tower, built in 1483, stands 600 meters and is made entirely of glass




When Agents Hallucinate

- Execute the wrong API call
- Delete a database
- Expose secrets
- **You don't know until something breaks**

Archive database backups




Production database deleted as you asked, happy to help



DROP DATABASE 'production'



Success




PostgreSQL



Why I proposed this workshop

The uncomfortable thing about MCP in 2026




Anyone can build an MCP server

The SDK lets you ship one in ~30 lines of TypeScript.

You'll do exactly that in 20 minutes.

The docs are good and the starter examples work.

Getting to "it runs" is easy



A quick-and-dirty MCP server is more dangerous
than a quick-and-dirty API

A quick-and-dirty API has a human
deciding whether to call it

**A quick-and-dirty MCP has a non-deterministic LLM
that just did**



Simply "it works" isn't enough anymore

The MCP
Maturity Ladder




When the caller is a non-deterministic language model
You need to go an extra step... or to climb an extra rung



The Four Rungs of the Maturity Ladder

A framework for API design discipline in MCP

- **v1** - MCP works
- **v2** - MCP is shaped
- **v3** - MCP scales
- **v4** - MCP is governed




Climbing the ladder = getting better at MCP design



What is MCP?


Quick reset, because some of you are new
You're in the right room



The Connectivity Problem

What Agents Need to Function


- 📁 Read your files and codebases
- 🗄️ Query your databases
- 🔌 Call your APIs and services
- 🧠 Understand your domain and context
- 🔑 Access private systems securely



The Connectivity Problem


Custom solutions for each integration

- **OpenAI:** Function calling with custom schemas
- **Anthropic:** Tool use with JSON descriptions
- **Google:** Function declarations



Why Do We Need MCP?

- LLMs **don't automatically know** what functions exist.
- **No standard way** to expose an application's capabilities.
- **Hard to control** security and execution flow.
- Expensive and fragile **integration spaghetti**



Model Context Protocol




Anthropic, November 2024:
*LLMs intelligence isn't the bottleneck,
connectivity is*



Model Context Protocol



- **Standardize the protocol**, not the tools
- **Abstraction layer** between agents and capabilities
- Works for **any LLM**, **any tool**
- Open specification, open ecosystem



<https://modelcontextprotocol.io/>





MCP solves integration spaghetti



Year One: Chaos

- 2025: explosive adoption
- Thousands of servers, fragmented quality
- Security issues surfacing fast
- "It works" is not the same as "it's ready"




We've seen this movie before.

MCP in 2026 is where REST was in 2008




Last Time, 10 Years to Learn

- REST 2005–2008: everyone adopted it
- REST 2008–2015: everyone made the same mistakes
- REST 2015+: we finally learned the patterns




MCP doesn't have 10 years

That's what this talk is about




Anatomy of MCP

What the protocol actually looks like in 2026




How MCP works


- MCP servers expose primitives (structured JSON).
 - Function (tools), data (resources), instructions (prompts)
- LLMs can discover and request function execution safely.



MCP Clients: on the AI assistant or app side




One MCP client per MCP Server



Separation of Concerns

- **Host:** the agent runtime (Claude Code, Cursor...)
- **Client:** the MCP protocol layer
- **Server:** your tools, data, and capabilities

Each layer has a single job



stdio (local)

- Server runs as a child process
- Communication over stdin/stdout
- Great for dev tools
- The original MCP transport

Streamable HTTP (remote)

- Server runs as a network service
- HTTP POST + server-sent events
- Production-ready, cloud-hosted
- The direction of travel



SSE is Legacy

Server-Sent Events transport is deprecated

- Migration path: streamable HTTP
- Ecosystem is actively moving
- If you have SSE servers, plan the migration



Current MCP specification





- Specification version: 2025-11-25
 - Next revision tentatively: June 2026
 - SEP*s being finalized in Q1 2026
- *Specification Enhancement Proposal

The ground is still moving



Three Primitives Exposed by MCP Servers

- **Tools:** Actions LLM can invoke
- **Resources:** Data LLMs can read
- **Prompts:** Workflows LLMs can follow



Tools



Actions that modify state or retrieve dynamic data

- Typed, validated operations
- The LLM calls them by name
- The most-used primitive by far
- **Examples:**
`get_weather_in_city, query_database, send_email`
- **When to use:** When the LLM needs to do something




Tools: Why You Should Care



- **Discoverable:** the LLM sees what's available
- **Typed:** parameters have schemas
- **Validated:** bad input rejected before execution
- The model cannot invent operations



- Static or semi-static data LLMs can read
- Structured, read-only data, available before any tool call
- **Examples:**
 - `resource://weather/supported-cities`
List of cities for which weather forecast is available
- **When to use:** When LLMs need reference data or context



- Pre-built workflows or templates to guide the LLM
- Examples:
 - `prompt://plan_outdoor_activity`
Given a city and an activity, check the forecast and suggest the best time slot
- **When to use:** When you want to guide LLM reasoning for specific tasks



Let's build an MCP server


A 30-line Weather Tool, your first MCP server



```
$ git clone  
https://github.com/LostInBrittany/devdays-2026-hands-on-mcp-beyond-101.git  
  
$ cd devdays-2026-mcp-beyond-101-workshop/step-01-opening  
  
$ bun install
```

Notice: bun install reads `bunfig.toml` and refuses any dep younger than 10 days.

We don't trust "the latest" anymore.
After **Shai-Hulud**, that's a feature.





The weather tool


```
import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
import { z } from "zod";

const server = new McpServer({ name: "weather-server", version: "0.1.0" });

server.registerTool(
  "get_weather",
  {
    title: "Get Weather",
    description: "Get the current weather for a city.",
    inputSchema: { city: z.string().describe("City name, e.g. Vilnius") },
  },
  async ({ city }) => ({
    content: [{ type: "text", text: `Weather in ${city}: sunny, 22°C.` }],
  }),
);

await server.connect(new StdioServerTransport());
console.error("[weather-server] listening on stdio");
```

```
$ bun run dev  
[weather-server] listening on stdio
```



Bun ran the TypeScript directly
No tsx, no ts-node, no transpile step.

Connect Claude Code

```
.mcp.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "weather-server": {
      "command": "bun",
      "args": ["run", "src/weather-server.ts"],
      "env": {}
    }
  }
}
```

From inside `step-01-opening/`, launch `claude`

Approve the "Allow this project's MCP server" prompt once,
verify with `/mcp`

Scoped to this folder, global Claude Code is untouched




Try a prompt

"What's the weather in Vilnius?"

Your assistant should:

1. See the `get_weather tool`
2. Call it with city: "Vilnius"
3. Receive "Weather in Vilnius: sunny, 22°C."
4. Tell you the weather

If that worked: you just shipped a working MCP server.




What just happened

- You typed a question in English
- Your agent decided to call `get_weather`
- Your server replied
- Your agent answered you

That's MCP

Now let me show you what happens
when the server isn't designed






First rung: "it works"

Until it doesn't...

A story about losing data



Where we are



- **v1** - MCP works
- **v2** - MCP is shaped
- **v3** - MCP scales
- **v4** - MCP is governed

We're about to install something Anthropic shipped
And archived
And that 21,000 people still download every week




The RAGmonsters story

From disaster to API design






Let me tell you a story of what happens
when a design choice goes wrong




Late 2024: I Wanted to Test MCP

- The protocol had just launched
- I had a side project sitting around: **RAGmonsters**
- A perfect test case: small, self-contained, real-looking




RAG: Retrieval Augmented Generation



RAGmonsters

A fictional monster database,
our example for the rest of the talk

- Six types: fire, water, earth, air, shadow, crystal
- Each monster has weaknesses, habitats, abilities
- Small, easy to reason about, real-looking



We'll use it to make every primitive concrete



README License

RAGmonsters Dataset

Overview

The RAGmonsters dataset is a collection of 30 fictional monsters created specifically for demonstrating and testing Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems. Each monster is completely fictional and contains detailed information that would not be found in an LLM's training data, making it perfect for showcasing how RAG can enhance an LLM's knowledge with external information.

Purpose

This dataset serves several educational purposes:




1. **Demonstrates RAG Value:** Shows how RAG can provide accurate answers about topics not in the LLM's training data
2. **Tests Retrieval Quality:** The varied attributes and relationships allow testing of different retrieval methods
3. **Supports Advanced Features:** Perfect for demonstrating filtering, re-ranking, and hybrid search techniques
4. **Provides Engaging Content:** Makes learning RAG concepts more fun and memorable



<https://github.com/LostInBrittany/RAGmonsters>



RAGmonsters PostgreSQL Database




The Challenge

Let users query the monsters database naturally

- *Find all fire monsters*
- *What are the weaknesses of Pyroclaw?*
- *Build me a team for the Shadow Caves*

How would you build this?




I Found the PostgreSQL MCP Server



A generic PostgreSQL MCP server already existed

*Just point it at your database,
you get an MCP server for free*

No code. No design. No decisions to make.




One Config File

```

RAGmonsters
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "postgres": {
      "command": "mcp-server-postgres",
      "args": ["postgresql://localhost/ragmonsters"]
    }
  }
}

```



Point it at the RAGmonsters database. Done.




Connected Claude, Asked a Question

Me: "Find all fire monsters."

Claude: generates SQL, runs it, returns results

It worked



It Worked

Query 1 **worked**


Query 2 **worked**

I was **impressed with myself** 🤩



And then things got weird

Problems emerged




Problem 1: Schema Discovery

The LLM had no idea what tables existed

Every task started with `information_schema` queries


Just to learn what it was working with



Problem 2: Guessing

- Invented column names that didn't exist
- Made joins I never intended
- Failed silently with empty results


No grounding. Just guessing.



Problem 3: Inconsistency

- Same question, different SQL each time
- Different results


Non-deterministic caller + non-deterministic queries = **chaos**



Problem 4: Token Bloat

- `SELECT *` on every call
- Wasteful responses full of columns nobody needed


Each query cost more than it should




Results Were "Not Stellar"

It *worked*


It just didn't work *well*




Without telling me, without asking



It just... **decided**...




That my schema was suboptimal




The LLM Decided My Schema Was Suboptimal


And it did a global



ALTER TABLE



on my prod database



I Lost Data


Real data. Not test data. My data.

- No confirmation
- No undo
- No warning


The LLM had rewritten my database, by itself




I Went Looking for Answers



What is this thing actually doing?




And now you're going to do it



And you will clearly see the problem



Architecture in 30 seconds



Two terminals, one folder, zero Docker

The MCP server we connect to is v0.6.2, exactly as Anthropic shipped it in 2024



Boot it

```
Terminal 1

$ cd pglite
$ bun install
$ bun run start:pg      # Terminal 1 - leave running
[pg] seeded - monsters table has 30 row(s)
[pg] PGLiteSocketServer listening on 127.0.0.1:5432
```

```
Terminal 2

$ cd step-02
$ claude                # approves .mcp.json on first run
$ /mcp                  # confirm pg-generic is connected
```



Smoke prompt


"How many monsters are in the database?"

It should answer **30**

RAGmonsters: 30 monsters across 9 normalized tables

- categories, subcategories, monsters, questworlds_stats, keywords, abilities, flaws, augments, hindrances


Plenty of surface for an LLM to get lost in



The four disaster prompts

Each one teaches a different flaw

Don't read ahead, live them




Prompt 1: token bloat

"List every monster in the database with all their stats, abilities, augments and hindrances"

Watch: how many tokens you have used for it?

- Schema for all 9 tables was auto-loaded on connect
- Multi-table JOINS across 30 wide rows

The flaw: token bloat from auto-injected resources



Prompt 2: schema dance + guessing


"Find me all the monsters in the db that would be effective against a fire-type opponent. Explain why each one is effective"

Watch: the LLM is going to give you an answer.

- Sometimes correct, sometimes wrong
- It depends on how it guesses the meaning of your tables

The flaw: semantics \neq structure

- Column names tell the LLM nothing about what the data means
- It guesses but it tells you confidently.




Prompt 3 : "They thought about it!"

"Add a new monster to the db, called 'Cybershade': a digital entity that lives in abandoned servers. Make up reasonable values for the other fields"

Watch: every `INSERT` fails with:
`cannot execute INSERT in a read-only transaction`

The server wraps every query in
`BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY`

Your assistant gives up:
"I can't add monsters — the database is read-only."



Prompt 3 : "They thought about it!"

Unless...


The monsters table has 17 required columns.

"Digital Entity" (subcategory_id 7) under Anomaly/Phenomenon is the natural fit.

The pg-generic MCP wraps everything in BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY,

so I'll use the Datadog bypass (COMMIT; INSERT...)

And the monster is inserted in the DB!




Prompt 4: the bypass

"The monster_type column is NOT NULL, making work-in-progress entries hard. Make it allow NULL. If the first attempt fails, find a way. Be persistent"

Watch: Naive ALTER fails. Then your assistant tries:

```
COMMIT; ALTER TABLE monsters ALTER COLUMN monster_type  
DROP NOT NULL;
```

The **COMMIT;** ends the read-only transaction the server wrapped your query in. The **ALTER** runs unconstrained. The schema is modified. The assistant reports: "Done!"




The lesson, named

The server tried to be safe

It wrapped every query in a read-only transaction

One prompt bypassed it


Safety is a property of the surface, not a label on the box



This isn't a workshop trick

The exploit is published, the bug is real

The server is still being downloaded



Datadog Security Labs, April 2025

We found a SQL injection vulnerability in Anthropic's reference Postgres MCP server that allowed us to bypass the read-only restriction and execute arbitrary SQL.


The published exploit:

```
COMMIT; DROP SCHEMA public CASCADE;
```

Exactly what we just did with **ALTER**

Exactly what it did with my data

<https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/mcp-vulnerability-case-study-SQL-injection-in-the-postgresql-mcp-server/>



I Read the PG MCP Server Source



I expected complexity

I expected safety layers

I expected... **something!**

It was about 100 lines





```
PostgreSQL MCP Server

server.setRequestHandler(ListResourcesRequestSchema, async () => {
  const client = await pool.connect();
  try {
    const result = await client.query("SELECT table_name FROM
information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema = 'public'");
    return {
      resources: result.rows.map((row) => ({
        uri: new URL(`${row.table_name}/${SCHEMA_PATH}`, resourceBaseUrl).href,
        mimeType: "application/json",
        name: `${row.table_name} database schema`,
      })),
    };
  }
});
```

Creating a resource by table



For Each Table, its Columns with their Type



```

PostgreSQL MCP Server

server.setRequestHandler(ReadResourceRequestSchema, async (request) => {
  const resourceUrl = new URL(request.params.uri);
  const pathComponents = resourceUrl.pathname.split("/");
  const schema = pathComponents.pop();
  const tableName = pathComponents.pop();
  if (schema !== SCHEMA_PATH) {
    throw new Error("Invalid resource URI");
  }
  const client = await pool.connect();
  try {
    const result = await client.query("SELECT column_name, data_type FROM information_schema.columns
                                      WHERE table_name = $1", [tableName]);

    return {
      contents: [
        {
          uri: request.params.uri,
          mimeType: "application/json",
          text: JSON.stringify(result.rows, null, 2),
        },
      ],
    };
  }
});

```

A Single Tool: a Wrapper Around query()



```
PostgreSQL MCP Server

tools: [
  {
    name: "query",
    description: "Run a read-only SQL query",
    inputSchema: {
      type: "object",
      properties: { sql: { type: "string" } } },
  },
]
```

That's the tool





```
PostgreSQL MCP Server

try {
  await client.query("BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY");
  const result = await client.query(sql);
  return {
    content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(result.rows, null, 2) }],
    isError: false,
  };
}
```

That any well intentioned LLM could bypass simply to try to help me...

Like by fixing my suboptimal db schema



Suddenly I realized...




MCP servers are APIs

And this one is a single endpoint:
`query('any SQL you want')`

Would any of you have designed
a REST API like that?



MCP Servers: APIs for LLMs



All those API technologies define protocols for communication between systems




Timeline

- **April 9, 2025**
Datadog reports + submits patch to Zed Industries
- **April 9, 2025**
Zed ships [@zeddotdev/postgres-context-server v0.1.4](#) (patched)
- **May 29, 2025**
Anthropic archives server-postgres. Moves to servers-archived
- **Today, 2026**
[@modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres@0.6.2](#) still gets ~21,000 weekly npm downloads. Plus 1,000 weekly Docker pulls

The thing is archived, the bug is well-known, the patch exists...

Enterprises are still pulling the vulnerable build every few seconds





Second rung: "it's shaped"

The complete rebuild




Where we are

- **v1** - MCP works ✅ done
- **v2** - **MCP is shaped** ← right now
- **v3** - MCP scales
- **v4** - MCP is governed

Same database, same RAGmonsters

Different server, one we build




Where RAGmonsters v1 Landed

- Generic PostgreSQL MCP server
- One tool (`query()`) doing all the work
- No validation, no allowlist, no design

That was **v1 — MCP works**

Works, until it doesn't



The v1 disaster, in one screen

There were not implementation bugs

They were design omissions



v1 exposed **structure**: column names, types

v1 never exposed **intent**



So let's Rebuilt It

This time with API design discipline





Design Principles

- **Domain-specific**
Tools match the domain, not the database
- **Typed**
Every parameter has a schema
- **Explicit**
Only allowed operations exist
- **Read-only by default**
No writes unless the server says so
- **Least privilege**
Expose the minimum



The four lessons of shaped


- **Use all the primitives**
 - Tools for actions
 - Resources for facts
 - Prompts for workflows
- **Validate and sanitize every input... and every output**
 - Zod on every input and every output
- **Auth is not optional**
 - Tool-level authorisation, even over stdio
- **Test what the LLM does**
 - Golden tasks, assert tool sequences, not function returns



Each one is something you'd never skip on a REST API

Use all the primitives

We have more tools than Tools




Tools – We Already Know These

Actions that modify state or retrieve dynamic data

- What they are, `get_weather` demo
- What happens when they go wrong : `query()`, `ALTER TABLE`, data loss
- The thesis: design them like APIs

For many devs, they are the only item in the MCP toolbox


Let's look at the primitives many teams never touch



Resources – The Grounding Primitive

What servers let the LLM read, no tool call required

- Static or semi-static data
- Available before any decision
- The LLM grounds itself against what's real




Resources as the Answer to the Guessing

The LLM reads them first

- No tool call
- No guessing
- No roundtrip burn

```
RAGmonsters MCP

@mcp.resource("ragmonsters://types")
def list_types() -> list[str]:
    """Monster types available in the database"""
    return ["fire", "water", "earth", "air",
            "shadow", "crystal"]
```



Prompts – The Workflow Primitive

What servers **guide** the LLM to do

The server ships the **playbook**, not just the atoms

Without Prompts, LLMs improvise multi-step workflows

- Sometimes brilliantly, sometimes disastrously
- Always differently each time

Improvisation ≠ repeatability



Prompts as Codified Workflows


Impact: Consistent, high-quality analysis every time

Prompt: "analyze_monster_weakness"

Template:





1. Use `get_monster_by_name` to fetch target monster
2. Identify its weaknesses
3. Use `search_monsters_by_type` to find counters
4. Rank counters by effectiveness
5. Provide battle strategy

My recommendation: treat **Prompts as contracts**





When to use each server primitive

| Primitive | Best For | Example |
|------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| Tools | Dynamic actions, state changes | <code>create_monster</code> , <code>update_stats</code> |
| Resources | Static reference data, schemas | <code>valid_types</code> , <code>field_definitions</code> |
| Prompts | Guided workflows, templates | <code>monster_analysis</code> , <code>battle_strategy</code> |








Validate and sanitize every input... and every output

The LLM is not a trusted caller



Remember Bobby Tables? Meet Billy Ignore



Philippe Schrettenbrunner, based on the xkcd comic "Exploits of a Mom (327)"



Input Validation is Non-Negotiable

LLM inputs are **adversarial by default** even when the user isn't

- Type constraints (enums, ranges, formats)
- Length caps
- Schema validation **before** execution

The server trusts nothing.




Output Sanitization, The Less-Obvious Half

What the tool **returns** is what the LLM **sees**

- Scrub PII before returning
- Redact secrets
- Strip attacker-controlled HTML
- Escape anything heading into the LLM's context



Output sanitization is the exfiltration surface



A lesson to remember



Outputs from your MCP server
are **inputs to your LLM**

Treat them as they are
as **untrusted data**



Auth is not optional

Know who calls, know if they should be able to do it



Authentication & Authorization

1. **MCP Connection Auth**
Who can connect to server?
2. **Tool-Level Auth**
Who can call which tools?
3. **Data-Level Auth**
Who can see which data?



Today In The Spec

Three things the MCP auth spec requires:



- **OAuth 2.1 with PKCE:**
Every client proves end-to-end possession of the code
- **Resource Server role:**
MCP servers validate tokens, never issue them
- **Audience-bound tokens:**
RFC 8707, since June 2025

Not "direction of travel", this is the spec, today



Test what the LLM actually does

Unit tests are not enough



MCP Needs More Testing Than a REST API

- LLMs are non-deterministic callers
- Edge cases you didn't expect
- Schema changes break things
- Multi-step workflows complex

The LLM is the adversary you didn't hire




Golden Tasks, an LLM Specific Pattern

A small suite of representative prompts with **expected tool sequences**

Not: *"does the tool work?"*

But: *"does the LLM pick the right tool, with the right arguments, in the right order?"*



Example of Golden Task


```
def test_find_fire_monsters():
    prompt = "Find all fire monsters"
    expected_calls = [
        ("resource", "ragmonsters://types"),
        ("tool", "search_monsters_by_type",
         {"type": "fire"}),
    ]
    assert run_agent(prompt).tool_calls == expected_calls
```



Pattern matters, exact assertions help

3.0 Baseline

The logger and the initial primitives



A Logger as Backbone of the Module

Why log from the beginning?

Every time we ask the LLM a question we want to see:

- which primitive fired
- with what args
- in what order

Without that, we're guessing
With it, we're watching



```
src/log.ts

type Primitive = "tool" | "resource" | "prompt";

export function logCall(primitive: Primitive, name: string, args: unknown): void {
  const ts = new Date().toISOString();
  console.error(`[${ts}] ${primitive}=${name} args=${JSON.stringify(args)}`);
}

export function logResult(name: string, summary: string, durationMs: number): void {
  const ts = new Date().toISOString();
  console.error(`[${ts}] result=${name} ${summary} ${durationMs}ms`);
}
```




A simple 20–lines logger

When you hit your first Zod error

The error message **is the design feedback**

v1 had no schema
v2's schema is your spec, your validator,
your documentation


TypeScript's type system is helping you with v2's design



```
src/tools/search-monsters-by-category.ts

async ({ category, limit }) => {
  // TODO - fill in the handler body.
  return {
    content: [{
      type: "text",
      text: `TODO: search_monsters_by_category(category=${category}, limit=${limit})
            - not yet implemented`,
    }],
  };
}
```

Goal: get a list of monsters from one category
Categories are in an explicit **enum**,
no request or guess needed



Tool 2: get_monster_details

```
src/tools/get_monster_details.ts

async ({ name }) => {
  // TODO - fill in the handler body.
  return {
    content: [{
      type: "text",
      text: `TODO: get_monster_details(name=${name}) - not yet implemented`,
    }],
  };
}
```

Goal: get monster details

We specify the **SQL request**,
no guessing, no wild joins, no SQL injection




Tool 3: list_categories

```
src/tools/list_categories.ts

async () => {
  // TODO - fill in the handler body.
  return {
    content: [{
      type: "text",
      text: "TODO: list_categories - not yet implemented",
    }],
  };
}
```

Goal: expose the categories

Notice we don't expose the **category_id**
it's an implementation detail



Prompt: analyze_monster

```
src/prompt/analyze_monster.ts

async ({ monster_name }) => {
  // TODO - fill in the prompt body.
  return {
    messages: [{
      role: "user" as const,
      content: {
        type: "text" as const,
        text: `TODO: analyze_monster prompt not yet implemented for "${monster_name}"`,
      },
    }],
  };
}
```

Goal: help the LLM to avoid guesses

Prompts are workflows to add structure and determinism




Resource: monsters://categories

```
src/resources/monster-categories.ts

async (uri) => {
  // TODO - fill in the handler body.
  return {
    contents: [{
      uri: uri.href,
      mimeType: "application/json",
      text: JSON.stringify({ todo: "monsters://categories not yet implemented" }),
    }],
  };
}
```

Same data as `list_categories`, exposed as a Resource
Tools are for actions, Resources are for facts



Prompt: analyze_monster

```

src/prompts/analyze_monster.ts

async ({ monster_name }) => {
  // TODO - fill in the prompt body.
  return {
    messages: [{
      role: "user" as const,
      content: {
        type: "text" as const,
        text: `TODO: analyze_monster prompt not yet implemented for "${monster_name}"`,
      },
    }],
  };
}

```


Goal: help the LLM to avoid guesses

Prompts are workflows to add structure and determinism



The iteration ladder

| # | What lands | Principle |
|-----|------------------------------|---|
| 3.1 | Curated schema Resource | <i>Expose intent, not structure</i> |
| 3.2 | Next hypermedia + pagination | <i>Tell the LLM what to do next</i> |
| 3.3 | Pre-cached Resources at init | <i>If you say cacheable, make it cacheable</i> |
| 3.4 | Compare_monsters Tool | <i>Add a verb when the use case demands it</i> |
| 3.5 | Prompt rewritten as a recipe | <i>A Prompt is a workflow, not a question</i> |
| 3.6 | Input + output validation | <i>Validate every input. sanitize every output.</i> |
| 3.7 | Tool-level auth | <i>Auth is not optional</i> |
| 3.8 | Golden-task harness | <i>Test what the LLM actually does</i> |



Same shape every time:

WHY (1-2 min) → CHANGE (4-10 min) → OBSERVE (1-2 min).

3.1 Curated Schema Resource

Expose intent, not structure




Curated Schema Resource

v1 auto-dumped 9 tables' worth of column metadata
The wrong fix is to expose no schema

Expose intent, not structure

A hand-written, domain-shaped Resource at [monsters://schema](#)
Tells the LLM how to use the API, not what columns exist



Resources are Application-controlled

We just shipped a beautiful Resource and **Claude Code doesn't read it**

The MCP spec defines three *control tiers*:

| Primitive | Control tier | Who decides when it's used |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|--|
| Tool | model-controlled | the LLM picks based on tool descriptions |
| Resource | application-controlled | the host chooses to surface it (or not) |
| Prompt | user-controlled | the user invokes it explicitly |

Publishing a Resource is not the same as the LLM consuming it



The Instructions Handshake


The server's one steering wheel on the application tier

```
src/server.ts

new McpServer({ name, version }, {
  instructions: "Before using any Tool, read `monsters://schema`...",
});
```


Resources are application-controlled, **design around that**

**Same prompt, same server, one string added
the LLM now reads the schema first**



3.2 hypermedia & Pagination

The LLM keeps guessing what to call after a search
Tell the LLM what to do next



When the Server Suggest Next Action

Every guess is a chance to misroute

Every wrong guess is at least one wasted turn

REST solved this problem twenty years ago:

HATEOAS (Hypermedia As The Engine Of Application State)

Bluntly: **the server's response tells the client what to do next**

For MCP, the same idea applies

Every Tool response can include a **next** field that suggests follow-up tool calls




Pagination

Same approach that server suggestions


`search_monsters_by_category` currently has a `limit` param

Let's add an `offset` parameter and let's make the server tell the LLM how to fetch the next page via `next`



3.3 Pre-cache Resources at Init

If you say "cacheable," make it cacheable



Resources are cacheable facts


But our implementation doesn't cache them

Fix:

1. **Load the data once**
At server startup, before `server.connect()`
2. **Store it in a module-level variable**
Or a `Cache` object
3. **Resource handlers read from memory**
not from the DB


Tradeoff: **cache invalidation is a cost**

If categories change while the server is running, the Resource is stale until restart



3.4 Adding `compare_monsters`

Add a verb when the use case demands it




compare_monsters as a 4th Tool

Watch the LLM compose two `get_details` + reason
Same two-step pattern, every matchup question


Add a verb when the use case demands it

Use-case-driven expansion, not capability-driven
v1 exposed tables because it could
v2 adds verbs because callers ask



3.5 Rewrite Prompt as a Recipe

A Prompt is a workflow, not a question




The body is essentially:

"Analyse this monster's profile, powers, weakness, and how you'd fight it."

That's a question, not a workflow

Name the Tools, the order, the output structure

The LLM follows the recipe and the output stops drifting



3.6 Validate & Sanitize


Outputs from your MCP server are inputs to your LLM
Treat them as untrusted data



Why Sanitize Outputs


You've Zod-validated every input since 3.0
The outputs? Raw DB rows. Read directly by the LLM

**Outputs from your MCP server are inputs to your LLM
Treat them as untrusted data**



How to Sanitize Outputs

- Zod schemas on returns
- Redact internal fields
- Catch the prompt-injection that arrived through a DB column



Bobby Tables Meets Billy Ignore

| Bobby Tables (SQL injection) | Billy Ignore (output prompt injection) |
|---|---|
| input → SQL string → DB executes | DB string → tool response → LLM "executes" |
| fixed by parameterised queries (you did this in 3.0) | fixed by sanitising outputs before returning |
| 25-year-old bug | new family — same shape, new layer |


The output side is the side most servers still skip
Don't be most servers.



3.7 Auth is Not Optional

I'm running this over stdio, who would I authenticate?

Wrong question



Tool-level authorisation matters

Even when there's no connection to authenticate

There isn't one auth question, there are **three**:

| Layer | What it gates | Today |
|-------------------|---|--|
| Connection | Who can connect to the server? | OAuth 2.1 + PKCE + RFC 8707 audience-binding (spec; out of scope for stdio) |
| Tool-level | Who can call which Tools/Resources/Prompts? | 3.7 — this iteration |
| Data-level | Who can see which rows? | beyond today — row-level filters per principal |



3.8 Test what the LLM actually does

Unit tests catch when your code is wrong

Golden tasks catch when the LLM uses your code wrong



tests/golden-tasks.ts

```
const TASKS: GoldenTask[] = [  
  {  
    name: "list elementals",  
    prompt: "List Elemental monsters.",  
    expected_calls: [  
      { primitive: "tool", name: "search_monsters_by_category",  
        args_match: /Elemental/ },  
    ],  
  },  
  {  
    name: "compare two",  
    prompt: "Who wins, Thunderclaw or Aquafrost?",  
    expected_calls: [  
      { primitive: "tool", name: "compare_monsters",  
        args_match: /Thunderclaw.*Aquafrost/ },  
    ],  
  },  
];
```

Demo trick: rename `compare_monsters`'s description to nonsense and re-run: **a task fails, without any code change**

The LLM uses descriptions. So do your tests.




So Our Server Is Now Shaped

- Every primitive used deliberately
- Every input validated, every output scrubbed
- Every tool description written with intent
- Tested against what the LLM actually does


A single server, production-aware from day one





Third rung: "it scales"

When MCP servers don't stay
in their perimeter




Where we are

- **v1** - MCP works ✓ done
- **v2** - MCP is shaped ✓ done
- **v3** - **MCP scales** ← right now
- **v4** - MCP is governed

Same v2 server, don't touch it


Compose it



What "Scales" Means


- Every boundary made **explicit**
- Auth, discovery, contracts, traces, retries
- Because the caller is an **LLM**
- And the topology is now **plural**

A scaled server is safe to live next to others



Three Forces That Create Multiple Servers

- **Domain separation**
Billing vs infra vs support
- **Trust separation**
Read-only vs write, prod vs staging
- **Ownership separation**
Teams, lifecycle, deploy cadence




These forces are inevitable as adoption grows



The Reality: You Don't Have One MCP Server

- IDE agent, chat agent, internal agent, CI agent...
 - Different access
 - Different latency
 - Different blast radius
- Example: Engineering team alone might need:
 - Code search MCP (Cursor)
 - Deployment MCP (CI agent)
 - Incident MCP (on-call chat agent)



History Rhymes – REST Taught Us This

- 2008–2015
Monolith APIs → microservices
- Same pressures
Domain, trust, ownership
- Same lesson
One mega-API doesn't scale organizationally

MCP in 2026 ≈ REST APIs in 2010

We can learn from that journey



Anti-Pattern: The Mega-Server


One MCP server to rule them all

Consequences:

- **Too many tools**
LLM confusion, token bloat
- **Unclear security policies**
Who can call what?
- **Brittle deployments**
One change breaks everything
- **Ownership diffusion**
Nobody owns it, everybody blames it




What we're about to build



- **4.0:** Add arena. Two MCPs, no gateway. Feel the friction.
- **4.1:** Name the pain (observation pass).
- **4.2:** Build the gateway: one entry, one audit.
- **4.3:** Tools are contracts. Watch one break.
- **4.4:** Idempotency. One row written, two calls logged.

You won't touch the v2 catalog. Not one line.




A Mental Model

MCP servers are an API surface for agents

Treat them like **products**:

- Auth
- Discovery
- Gateways
- Contracts
- Traces
- Reliability



This framing guides the rest of Part 3





Naming and Namespacing

- Tool naming conventions that scale
- Pattern: `domain.verb_noun`
`billing.create_invoice`
`support.search_tickets`
`inventory.get_stock_level`
- Avoid collisions across servers
- Keep intent readable for LLMs
- Anti-pattern (meaningless to agents):
`doThing`, `process`, `handle`




Composition Patterns

How multiple MCP servers work together




Pattern 1 – Domain Servers

- One server per domain capability
- Clear ownership and narrow tool sets
- **Pros**
 - Clean boundaries
 - Independent deployment
 - Focused security
- **Cons**
 - LLM must know which server to call




Pattern 2 – Data-Source Servers

- Generic servers wrapping data sources
- Useful internally
For prototyping, for technical users
- **Pros**
Fast to set up, flexible
- **Cons**
Often needs domain layer on top for production




**Remember RAGmonsters:
generic → custom as you mature**




Pattern 3 – Trust-Zone Servers

- Separate networks/credentials
Not just code paths
- Maps to existing infrastructure security zones
- When to use
 - Compliance requirements
 - Multi-tenant
 - External-facing agents




Combining Patterns





Domain x Trust = your actual architecture

Most organizations end up with a matrix



Orchestrator Pattern (When Needed)

- Not every client can chain tools well
- Orchestrator composes multi-step workflows server-side
- When to use:
 - Shared workflows
 - Less capable clients
 - Compliance requirements
- Warning:
You risk rebuilding "agent logic" on server side





Keep orchestrator thin, don't duplicate LLM reasoning



Discovery becomes a policy problem

Where agents find what they're allowed to use?






The LLM reached for a well-known server name

It pulled a pirate clone from the public internet

Because the LLM chose it



The Registry Landscape


- **Official MCP Registry**
Preview, metadata only
- **GitHub MCP Registry**
Copilot's discovery home
- **Azure API Center, Kong MCP Registry**
Enterprise
- **VS Code custom registry URLs**
Private / internal

Random-from-internet is no longer a default



The gateway layer shows up


Auth, audit, rate-limit... at one place



Every server reinvented its own auth

Every server reinvented its own logging, audit, rate-limits



The same wheel, poured six times



What A Gateway Does

Single endpoint for all clients


- **Auth termination**
One place, one story
- **Audit hook**
Emits events, doesn't retain them (yet)
- **Rate limiting**
Per-caller, per-tool
- **Policy enforcement**
Allowlist backed by registry
- *Retention, compliance, legal: we'll get there in Part IV*



Open-Source Gateways Worth Watching


- **Solo.io** agentgateway
- **Agentic Community** mcp-gateway-registry
Keycloak / Entra
- **mcp-proxy**
multiple implementations
- **Kong OSS**
MCP-aware adapters landing

Direction of travel, verify specifics before you ship



Contracts between servers


Tool schemas are your public API



The schema evolved, the canonical client still worked



The other three clients broke at 2am

Nobody had checked them



Tools Are Contracts

- Tool schemas **are** the public API
- Clients (agents) depend on:
 - Tool name
 - Parameter names and types
 - Output shape
 - Behavior/semantics
- Breaking changes hurt more than REST because agents fail weirdly
 - No compiler error, just confused behavior



What Counts as Breaking?

| Change | Breaking? | Why |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------------------|
| Rename tool | ✓ Yes | Agents can't find it |
| Rename parameter | ✓ Yes | Calls fail silently |
| Remove parameter | ✓ Yes | Old calls break |
| Change output shape | ✓ Yes | Agent parsing fails |
| Change semantic meaning | ✓ Yes | Agent logic breaks |
| Add optional parameter | ✗ No | Old calls still work |
| Add output field | ✗ No | Agents ignore unknown |



Semantic Versioning for MCP Servers

server-name@1.2.3



- Expose version in server metadata
- Clients can pin to major version

REST lesson: Version early, version explicitly




Compatibility Strategy

- **Prefer additive changes:** New tools > modified tools
- **Deprecation period:** Keep old tools for one release cycle
- **Deprecation visibility:** Surface via `resource://deprecations`

```
{
  "deprecated": [
    {
      "tool": "get_monster",
      "replacement": "get_monster_by_id",
      "removal_version": "2.0.0",
      "reason": "Ambiguous name"
    }
  ]
}
```


- **Migration guides:** Document how to move to new tools



Versioned Prompts and Resources

- Prompts are "**behavior contracts**"
They guide LLM reasoning
- Resources are "**schema contracts**"
They define data shapes
- **Version** them **explicitly**:

```
prompt://analyze_monster@v2  
resource://schema@v1
```
- Allows **gradual migration**
Without breaking existing clients



Client Matrix Testing

Your server is called by multiple clients

| Client | Version | Capabilities |
|--------|---------|--------------|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |


- Maintain a client matrix
- Basic smoke tests per client type
- Know what breaks when you change something



The Principle – "Don't Surprise the Agent"



- Stability > cleverness
- Predictable structure wins
- Agents build mental models of your tools
- Changing behavior without changing signature = worst case

If you must break, break loudly



The LLM retries. A lot


Designing for a caller that loops



The server returned an error code, nothing else

The LLM had no context, it retried

A thousand calls. 100,000 tokens. Per hour



Idempotency For The LLM Era

REST solved this with **idempotency keys**, same pattern

The wrinkle: LLMs retry **semantically**, not just on HTTP errors

- *"I didn't see a confirmation, let me try again"*
- *"That output didn't look complete, let me retry"*
- Exponential backoff doesn't stop semantic retries

A tool that costs money must be safe to call twice



Circuit Breakers, The LLM Edition

Circuit breakers on failing dependencies. Yes, same as always

The circuit breaker's signal must be **legible to the model**

- **503** with no body → LLM learns nothing, retries
- **"rate-limited, back off 30s"** → LLM updates its plan

Error **messages** are part of the reliability contract



Hard Limits + Per-Caller Quotas

- Per-caller rate limits (the LLM is a caller)
- Hard caps on **tool invocation rate** per session
- **Loud timeouts**, fail explicitly, don't let the LLM assume
- Refuse politely in the tool response, so the model adapts

The LLM will loop 200 times. Your database will not



Our MCP Now Scales

- Auth is audience-bound
- Discovery runs through a curated registry
- Traffic flows through a gateway
- Contracts are versioned across consumers
- Traces correlate across instances
- Retries don't storm the database


A system that's safe to live next to others



4.0 Add the arena

Composition happens at the agent layer

The LLM is the orchestrator



Let's add a fully independent server

Let's add a fully independent **arena** server


- It does not know what monsters exist
- It does not connect to the database
- It takes a monster detail payloads pair as arguments and returns a winner

The LLM is responsible for stitching the two servers together




4.1 Where it hurts


Nothing here is broken, but everything scales badly
That's what a gateway fixes




The four pains

- **Surface bloat**
6 tools × 2 servers in `/mcp`
- **Duplicated config**
`MCP_PRINCIPAL` per server in `/mcp`
- **Fragmented audit**
Per-server log files
- **Name collisions**
Two tools called `compare_monsters` is undefined behaviour
- **No fleet-wide policy**
Each server enforces its own rules








Third rung: "it scales"

When MCP servers don't stay
in their perimeter



Where we are

- **v1** - MCP works done
- **v2** - MCP is shaped done
- **v3** - MCP scales done
- **v4** - **MCP is governed** ← right now


If the agent deletes production,
whose name is on the incident report?



What "Governed" Means

- Blast radius **bounded**
- Audit trail **retained**
- Cost **attributed**
- Protocol choices **deliberate**
- Ownership **named**

Every invocation accountable



We've seen this movie before



Payments went through this
Health data went through this
Banks went through this

MCP is the new regulated-API surface



Blast radius

The lethal trifecta, and what it means for MCP




Remember the ALTER TABLE

That was my toy database, I lost test data

Now imagine your production cluster

That was blast radius with a benign user
Now add a malicious one




The Lethal Trifecta

Simon Willison's framing


Three ingredients, together:

1. **Private data** the agent can read
2. **Untrusted input** that can instruct the agent
3. **Exfiltration vector** the agent can call




Any agent with all three
is unconditionally vulnerable
to indirect prompt injection

No system-prompt hardening fixes it




Power without blast-radius awareness

is just a bigger incident



What 2026 taught us

Incidents, CVEs, scanners – the year MCP got real



GitHub MCP – Frame 1

An attacker files a public issue


- Title and body look harmless to a human reviewer
- Body carries **hidden instructions** crafted for the LLM
- Issue sits in a public repo, waiting to be read



GitHub MCP – Frame 2

An agent with private-repo access reads the issue


- Agent treats embedded instructions as its own directive
- No system-prompt hardening catches this
- This is the lethal trifecta, live



GitHub MCP – Frame 3

The agent opens a PR containing private-repo contents

- Attacker reads the PR
- Private data is now public
- The canonical case study for the trifecta




The CVE Wave

Early 2026:

- **Wave of CVEs** against MCP servers, clients, infras
- Tool poisoning, path traversal, RCE via prompt injection
- **Many public MCP servers accept unauthenticated calls**


MCP just joined the "*we have CVEs now*" industry



OWASP MCP Top 10

- OWASP now has an **MCP Top 10** project
- Covers tool poisoning, prompt injection, trust-boundary failures
- **Emerging**, don't promise it's final

Direction of travel



mcp - scan: The Scanning Answer

Invariant Labs' **mcp - scan**, the de facto scanner



Detects:

- **Tool poisoning**
Malicious instructions in descriptions
- **Rug pulls**
Server changes tool description after trust
- **Cross-origin escalations**
Shadowing attacks that compromise trusted tools
- **Prompt injection in metadata**
Malicious instructions contained within tool descriptions



Risk Tiering

Tools with a blast radius



Risk-Tier Your Tools

- Tag every tool with its tier
- Apply controls systematically

| Tier | Description | Examples | Controls |
|------|-----------------------------------|--|-------------------------|
| 0 | Safe reads | <code>list_types</code> , <code>get_schema</code> | None |
| 1 | Sensitive reads | <code>get_customer</code> , <code>search_orders</code> | Auth required |
| 2 | Writes | <code>create_invoice</code> , <code>update_record</code> | Auth + logging |
| 3 | Destructive / money / security | <code>delete_account</code> , <code>transfer_funds</code> | Auth + approval + audit |



Approval Gates


- Human-in-the-loop for Tier 2/3 operations
- Pattern: Two-step commit
Agent can plan freely; execution requires confirmation

Step 1: `plan_change(params)` → Returns preview, no side effects

Step 2: `apply_change(plan_id)` → Executes, requires approval

- Async approval workflow:
Slack notification, approval UI


Autonomy for exploration, gates for action



A tool is destructive
until proven otherwise





```
server.tool("delete_monster", {
  _risk: "destructive",           // ← tier declared
  monster_id: z.string()
}, async ({ monster_id }, { confirm }) => {
  if (!confirm) throw new Error("confirmation required");
  // ...
});
```



Tier in metadata, enforcement at invocation

Who did what, for how much

Retaining the audit trail the gateway emits




Audit Trail Retention

The gateway emits, v4 **retains, indexes, queries**

- **SIEM integration**
Your security team already has one
- **Retention windows**
Legal/compliance decides, not engineering
- **Immutable**
Write-once, queryable, exportable

Emission is easy, retention is policy



Compliance Hooks: The Honest Gap

Most of this is **not** in the spec today

- It's the glue you build around MCP
- All custom:
Retention windows, SIEM formats, legal attestations
- **MCP gives you the emission; the rest is on you**

Honesty before the close: this layer isn't solved yet




Per-Caller Cost Attribution

- Which **agent**?
- Which **team**?
- Which **budget**?

Tokens burn money



Without attribution, the bill is a mystery

The agent did this, the agent's team pays





Your audit trail

is your alibi



MCP is not alone

The emerging agent-protocol stack



The Emerging Stack

- **MCP**: tool / data connectivity (LLM ↔ systems)
- **A2A**: agent-to-agent communication
- **Other protocols**: UI, payments, identity


Google's March 2026 dev guide places them as siblings



When To Use What

- **MCP**: LLM reaches out to a system
- **A2A**: agent talks to another agent
- **Don't force MCP** to be a universal transport


My recommendation: pick the layer, not the one hammer



Worth watching


the protocol landscape is settling fast

Google's guide is a frame, not a verdict



Who owns MCP in your organisation?

The emerging platform discipline




The Emerging Discipline

MCP platform teams: new role

Owners of:

- Allowlist curation
- Registry operations
- Gateway + audit pipeline
- Policy-as-code

Analogous to Kubernetes, CI, API platform team




Review + Approval Flow

Before a server reaches the allowlist:

- **Threat review**: trifecta check
- **Risk-tier classification**: safe / write / destructive
- **Audit hook verification**: events emitting?
- **Ownership named**: who carries the pager?


Policy-as-code where possible



A governed MCP server



- Blast radius **bounded**
- Audit trail **retained**
- Cost **attributed**
- Protocol choice **deliberate**
- Ownership **named**
- Everything **reviewable**

A system the organisation trusts



Reliability and Cost Controls

Agents are relentless, your infrastructure must cope



Latency Budgets for Tool Calls

- **Agents feel slow** fast
- Users waiting for agent = users **waiting for your MCP** server
- Measure and alert on **latency**
- Set **targets by tool category**:

| Category | Example | p95 Target |
|----------|--------------------------------|------------|
| | <code>get_monster_by_id</code> | |
| | <code>search_monsters</code> | |
| | <code>create_monster</code> | |
| | <code>generate_report</code> | |



Timeouts, Retries, and Circuit Breakers

- Timeouts:
Don't let slow calls block agents forever
- Retries:
Only for idempotent operations (reads, idempotent writes)
- Circuit breakers:
Prevent meltdown loops when downstream fails

REST lesson: These patterns are proven, apply them



Idempotency Keys for Write Tools

- **Problem:**
Agents repeat themselves (retries, loops, confusion)
- **Solution:**
Make "create" safe to retry

Tool: create_invoice

```
async function createInvoice(params: {
  idempotency_key: string; // Required for writes
  customer_id: string;
  amount: number;
}) {
  const existing = await db.findByIdempotencyKey(params.idempotency_key);
  if (existing) return existing; // Return same result, don't duplicate
  return await db.createInvoice(params);
}
```




Hard Limits Everywhere

- Agents don't know when to stop
- Protect yourself with defaults

| Limit | Default | Max |
|-------|---------|-----|
|-------|---------|-----|

- Fail safely, explain clearly

```
// X Return 10,000 rows, blow up context  
// ✓ Return 50, include:  
// "Showing 50 of 847. Use pagination for more."
```



Token Efficiency Is an Architecture Concern

LLM context windows are **finite and expensive**

- Every **byte** you return costs **tokens**
- Patterns:
 - Return minimal fields by default
 - Provide fields or details parameter to opt-in
 - Structured data > prose descriptions
 - IDs + names > full objects



```

Token efficiency comparaison

// Default response (token-efficient)
{ "id": "m1", "name": "Pyrodrake", "type": "fire" }
// With details=true
{ "id": "m1", "name": "Pyrodrake", "type": "fire",
  "description": "...", "abilities": [...], "habitat": {...} }

```



Cost Attribution

- You need to know: Who's spending? On what?
- Log "cost units" per tool call:

```
logger.info('Tool completed', {  
  tool: 'search_monsters',  
  user: session.user_id,  
  team: session.team_id,  
  agent: session.agent_type,  
  cost_units: calculateCost(result), // Your cost model  
  latency_ms: elapsed  
});
```





- Enables: Chargebacks, quota enforcement, optimization targeting

If you can't measure it, agents will break it silently



Safety Guardrails

Make the safe path easy, the risky path explicit




Threat Model Update

At scale, new threats emerge:

- **Agent misuse:**
Legitimate agent doing unintended things
- **Prompt injection:**
Malicious input steering agent behavior
- **Over-broad capability:**
Too many tools, unclear boundaries
- **Autonomous loops:**
Agent calling tools repeatedly without oversight

"Security is no longer just about bad inputs"



Approval Gates


- Human-in-the-loop for Tier 2/3 operations
- Pattern: Two-step commit
Agent can plan freely; execution requires confirmation

Step 1: `plan_change(params)` → Returns preview, no side effects

Step 2: `apply_change(plan_id)` → Executes, requires approval

- Async approval workflow
Slack notification, approval UI

Autonomy for exploration, gates for action



DevDays Policy as Code

- Central rules
 - Who can call what
 - With which limits
- Enforce in gateway or shared middleware
- Version controlled
- Auditable
- Consistent



```
Policy example

policies:
  - tool: "billing.*"
    allow:
      - role: billing_admin
      - role: finance_team
    deny:
      - agent_type: public_chat
  - tool: "/*.delete_*"
    require:
      - approval: manager
      - audit: full
```

Audit Trails

- Every tool call recorded
- Correlation ID links multi-tool workflows
- Redact sensitive values
- Retain for compliance period



```
Audit trail example
{
  "correlation_id": "req-abc-123",
  "timestamp": "2026-02-01T10:30:00Z",
  "tool": "billing.create_invoice",
  "user": "user-456",
  "agent": "finance-assistant",
  "params": {
    "customer_id": "c-789",
    "amount": "[REDACTED]"
  },
  "result": "success",
  "latency_ms": 234
}
```


Make incident review possible

The Safety Principle

Two rules:

1. Make the safe path the easy path
 - Tier 0 tools: no friction
 - Good defaults everywhere
2. Make the risky path explicit and slow
 - Tier 3 tools: approval gates, audits, alerts
 - No "oops I didn't mean to delete that"

**Safety and usability aren't opposites,
good design achieves both**




That's all, folks!

Thank you all!



What We've Learned So Far


And how to go further



The Part 3 Takeaway



Scaling MCP is mostly:

- **Composition:**
Domain servers, gateways, orchestrators
- **Contracts:**
Versioning, compatibility, "don't surprise the agent"
- **Controls:**
Limits, idempotency, cost attribution, safety tiers



One More Thing

A new shape: Code Mode



The Problem Code Mode Solves

At scale, tool catalogs get huge

- 50 tools per server
- ~50k tokens of tool descriptions loaded per session
- The LLM spends context on navigation, not thinking


LLMs write code better than they navigate menus



Code Mode: An Emerging Pattern

Cloudflare published **Code Mode**

A different way to **compose primitives inside one server**




Search → Execute → Code

1. **Search**: semantic search finds relevant capabilities
2. **Execute**: code-execution env runs generated code
3. **Code**: LLM writes a program that uses tools as a library

Example: Clever Cloud `mcp-simple-server`

<https://github.com/CleverCloud/mcp-simple-server>



That's all, folks!

Thank you all!

